By Beverly C. Tyler July 22, 1780, General Washington, now back at headquarters in Dey Mansion in New Jersey, learned of British plans to attack the French fleet and the French Army at Newport, Rhode Island. On the morning of July 24, he received a letter from Benjamin Tallmadge, written on the 22nd. “I have this moment recd the enclosed from the Cu[lpe]r’s… I have forwarded that part of the Intelligence which respects the Destination of the British Fleet & Army Eastward, to Major Genl Heath.” As detailed in George Washington, Benjamin Tallmadge, and the Revolutionary War on L.I. (Part 8), Alexander Hamilton had already forwarded the information contained in Culper Jr’s. spy letter written with invisible ink to Lafayette who was on his way to meet with French General Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau in Newport. Major General Heath was in charge of American forces in Newport, so this information, forwarded by Tallmadge was, at the very least, a double check that the intelligence was getting through to the officers who needed it. In many of the letters, back and forth, to and from Washington’s headquarters, his lines of communication kept his officers aware of everything they needed to know and conversely kept Washington aware. Heath wrote to Washington on July 21. “This afternoon fifteen or sixteen British ships of war have made their appearance off this Harbour [Newport] to the eastward of Block Island–more than half of them I think are Ships of the Line–from appearances at sunsetting they intended to come to under Block Island…Admiral Greaves has probably joined Admiral Arbuthnot [based at Sag Harbor] and their design is to block up the Fleet of Monsieur Le Chevalier De Ternay, and if possible intercept the expected Second division of the French Fleet…” Washington replied to Heath on July 27. “…I have taken measures, as to the cruisers from Delaware, for advertising the 2d division of the present position of the enemy’s fleet, and their seeming intentions…” Thus, Washington took immediate action to inform the Second Division of the French Fleet, a decision in sharp contrast to the actions of the leader of the British Army. British General Clinton knew of the expected arrival of the French Fleet as American General Benedict Arnold had written a letter to Clinton on June 12. Arnold wrote his treasonous letter in code, “Six French Ships of the Line…Several Frigates, and a number of transports with 6,000 troops are expected at Rhode Island in two or three weeks to act under General Washington…Governor Trumbull is laying up flour and pork at Connecticut River for the French. The drafts, when completed, will make General Washington 20,000 [troops], but some states are so dilatory he does not expect strong reinforcements before August.” Yet Clinton and his admirals, couldn’t or wouldn’t, get their plans together before the French arrived, unchallenged, in Newport Harbor on July 11. It is understood that General Clinton and Admiral Arnold had issues with each other, and this seems to have been a factor in preventing them from organizing a proper response to both the expected arrival of the French Fleet and the vulnerability of the French Army in the first days and weeks after their arrival. Washington wrote to Rochambeau, commander of the French Army, in Newport on July 27, “I had the honor of addressing your Excellency this morning. I have just received advice from New York confirming our accounts heither-to of an embarkation to proceed up the Sound to Rhode Island. It is said to consist of the principal part of the Enemy’s Army, commanded by General Clinton in person; and was to have sailed this morning from White stone a few miles on the east side of hell gate. Thirty six peices of heavy cannon of different calibers, with two mortars, provided with shells and carcases, are also said to have been embarked–The Army [Continental] is already under marching Orders, and will without delay be put in motion toward New York, to endeavour to take advantage of General Clintons absence, or, at least, to embarrass and precipitate his movements…Go: Washington” Washington wrote to Major General Lafayette the same day, “…I perceive my Dear Marquis you are determined at all events to take New York, and that obstacles only increase your zeal. I am sorry our prospects instead of brightening grow duller. There is no probability of our getting the number [of men] we want from the states, so without the timely arrival of those we expect, or the assistance of our allies–this alone will prove an insuperable obstacle–Our levies come in even slower than I expected…Pensylvania has given us not quite four hundred, and seems to think she had done admirably–Jersey has given us fifty or sixty…” “Clinton still continues to threaten your countrymen with a combined attack [army and navy]. You will judge as well as me of the probability of his being sincere; but I have put the troops here under marching orders, and have ordered those at West Point to Kings ferry, If Clinton moves in force to Rhode Island we may possibly be able to take advantage of it, or we may embarrass him a little and precipitate his movements. In this case there are only two things that would hinder us from taking New York before you return–the want of men and arms to do it with.” On July 31, Washington wrote again to Lafayette, “I received your… Favors of the 26th just as I was commencing yesterday our second day’s march for the North River. There is no doubt that Sir Henry Clinton means to attack the Count de Rochambeau and that a considerable force has sailed for the purpose…considerations leave me but one line of conduct to pursue, which is to move against New York…That part of the Army which was with me in Jersey will pass the River at Kings ferry this morning or forenoon…” The same day he also wrote to Rochambeau, “…Sir Henry Clinton has sailed…with the principal part of his force to attack you–estimated at about eight thousand men; it cannot be more…I am glad the inactivity of the Enemy has given you time to prepare…I hope you will send them back with disgrace.” And so, the dye was cast, or was it? Clinton was now in Huntington Harbor, Long Island; having spent nearly a week getting his ships through the narrow, swift-moving current of Hell Gate, between New York Harbor and Long Island Sound. Washington was moving his New Jersey army toward New York while his units from the West Point area were moving south to Kings Ferry. On August 1, Washington wrote to Lafayette, “We are thus far, My dear Marquiss, (o)n our way to New-York. Tomorrow the whole army was to have taken up its line of march, and would have moved with all the rapidity in our power to this object, had we not a few hours since received advice from the Sound, dated yesterday that the fleet of transports had put back, and were steering westward.” Benjamin Tallmadge’s Dragoon Commander Col. Elisha Sheldon provided the same information in an August 1, letter to Washington, “P.S. The British Fleet that laid in Huntington Harbour Returned to the westward yesterday.” In the beginning of the same letter Sheldon wrote, “Last Evening I had the Honour of receiving your Excellencys favour of yesterday. In complyance therewith, I have this morning early sent off an officer with a sufficient number of my most trusty Dragoons to post three at every fifteen miles distance, or as near that as the Necessity of Forage &c. would admit,..The stages at which the Officer is ordered to post the Dragoons, are as follows, beginning at the eastward–vis. N. London, Lyme[,] Guilford, N. Haven, Stratford, Greensfarms, & Stamford, I dare not post another party between Stamford and Hd Qrs [Washington’s headquarters were now at the Daniel Birdsall House in Peekskill, New York] least the plunderers from below, which infest the intermediate Country should take off the men, or seize on the dispatches.” This Dragoon Express, an 18th century precursor to the 19th century Pony Express, was also used at times to move Culper spy intelligence by Tallmadge’s dragoons from Fairfield, Connecticut to Washington’s headquarters. Washington’s decision not to try and attack New York, since Clinton moved his army back to Flushing and Whitestone, did not change his need to have Sheldon’s Dragoons provide a rapid communication link between headquarters and the French in Newport. After July of 1780, for the next year, Washington and Rochambeau acted with caution as they faced shortages of both men and materials. Washington continued to favor, with the assistance of the French Army and Navy, an attack on New York as the best way to defeat General Clinton and end British control of the war. However; French and American intelligence and cooperation would begin to paint a different picture by the summer of 1781. (To be continued) Beverly Tyler is Three Village Historical Society historian and author of books available from the Three Village Historical Society, 93 North Country Rd., Setauket, NY 11733. Tel: 631-75 1-3730. WWW.TVHS.org
History Close at Hand: George Washington, Benjamin Tallmadge, and the Revolutionary War on L.I. (Part 9)
